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Note
The European Central Bank’s Securities Markets
Programme: Why a Necessary Response to the
European Debt Crisis Should Come to an End
Peter Doely*
The European Union Member States (“Member States”)
created the European Central Bank (“ECB”) to provide price
stability to the eurozone. The ECB is highly independent
because central bank independence is directly correlated to
providing price stability. In order to preserve the ECB’s
independence, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”) provides legal safeguards. One safeguard is a
prohibition on the ECB purchasing government bonds directly
from Member States. This safeguard helps to ensure that the
ECB does not monetize the debt of Member States, and it helps
to preserve the distinction between monetary policy and fiscal
policy.
In early 2010, the finances of several Member States, most
notably Greece, were in dire straits and investors began to
doubt those countries’ ability to repay their debts. Government
bond yields for those countries began to rise precipitously. In
addition to other European efforts to quell the crisis, the ECB
implemented the Securities Markets Programme (“SMP”) in
order to drive down the yields for those countries’ bonds and
provide liquidity to the securities markets. The SMP involved
the ECB purchasing government bonds from secondary
markets.
The ECB claims a legal basis for the SMP by
characterizing it as necessary for monetary policy. The ECB
reasons that the SMP is necessary to reestablish order in
dysfunctional markets and to preserve its transmission
J.D Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
University of Iowa. The author thanks his wife, Rachel Doely, for her support
which made all the research and drafts possible. He also thanks the MJIL
editors and staff for their comments and direction throughout this article’s
development. All errors and omissions are the author’s alone.
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mechanism for monetary policy. Critics have claimed that the
SMP has been a Trojan horse for fiscal policy. The ECB, they
claim, is primarily concerned with helping to relieve the debt
burden of potentially insolvent governments, and that acting
for such reasons is an implicit breach of the prohibition on debt
monetization.
This Note examines the monetary and fiscal justifications
for the SMP and discusses whether it compromises the ECB’s
independence. Part I examines the legal and economic bases for
the ECB’s independence and the events that necessitated the
SMP. Part II compares the plausible monetary and fiscal
reasons for the SMP. Finally, after examining options for
modifying the ECB’s ability to act, this Note concludes that the
Member States should limit the amount of government bonds
that the ECB is able to purchase in order to safeguard against
debt monetization, to preserve ECB independence and to
ensure the ECB fulfills its mandate of price stability.
I.

THE ECB, THE EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES, AND
THE CRISIS
In 1992 European Member States signed the Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”) and created the European Economic
and Monetary Union (“EMU”).1 This Treaty2 established the
framework of the European System of Central Banks (the
“ESCB”), including the ECB and central banks of Member
States.3 In addition, it laid out the ESCB’s responsibilities in
the EMU:
The primary objective of the European System of
Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to the objective of price
stability, the ESCB shall support the general
economic policies in the Union with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the
1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
2. For ease of reference, this Note will use the Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter
TEU]. This Note will also use the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47
[hereinafter TFEU] and Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J.
(C 83) 230 [hereinafter ECB Statute].
3. TFEU art. 4(2)(a).

DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013))

216

2/21/2013 1:51 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act
in accordance with the principle of an open
market economy with free competition,
favouring an efficient allocation of resources,
and in compliance with the principles set out in
Article 119.4
First and foremost, the ECB should “maintain price
stability.”5 In order to maintain price stability, a central bank
must keep inflation at a low and consistent level.6 This is
desirable because it allows participants in the economy to plan
and invest in the future with an accurate idea of the return on
their investments. This stability promotes sustained and
smooth economic growth.7 If price stability is maintained, the
ECB is also able to “support the general economic policies in
the Union,”8 though this goal is distinctly secondary.9 Member
States, not the ECB, are responsible for determining and
implementing their economic policies.10
As a means to price stability, the Member States made the
ECB what some have called “the world’s most legally
independent central bank.”11 There is a strong connection
between the insulation of central bankers from political
pressure and price stability.12 Because inflationary pressure
4. TFEU art. 127.
5. Id.
6. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 388–89. (2d ed. 1989). The ECB has interpreted the price
stability mandate to require inflation under 2% in the medium term. Press
Release, Governing Council of the European Cent. Bank, A Stability-oriented
Monetary Policy Strategy for the ESCB (Oct. 13, 1998), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr981013_1.en.html.
7. See MISHKIN, supra note 6.
8. TFEU art. 127.
9. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank,
Introductory Statement with Q&A at Frankfurt am Main (Mar. 6, 2008),
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2008/html/is080306.en.html
(“We have one needle in our compass, which is price stability.”).
10. See TFEU art. 120 (“Member states shall conduct their economic
policies . . . .”).
11. KARL KALTENTHALER, POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK 70 (2006).
12. See DAVID HOWARTH & PETER LOEDEL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK: THE NEW EUROPEAN LEVIATHAN? 119 (2003) (“Most empirical studies
have shown that countries with independent central banks achieve
substantially lower rates of inflation than countries in which the central bank
is controlled directly by the government.”); Patrick Deller, The European
System of Central Banks: Quo Vadis?, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 197–98 (1999)
(“[T]he independence of central banks is a prerequisite to the achievement of
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can lead to higher economic activity and employment in the
short term, inflation can work to the short term advantage of
governments.13 Thus, those who answer to an electorate are
more likely to encourage inflation because elections occur in the
short term. If they do, as a result inflationary pressure creates
uncertainty for market participants and discourages
investment.14
Politicians may also pressure the central bank to alleviate
sovereign debt already accrued through a process called “debt
monetization.”15 This is a process through which the central
bank directly or indirectly purchases sovereign debt, which
replaces securities in the market with currency, increases the
monetary base and may lead to inflation.16 This process
relieves the government of debt in two ways: first, all payments
it makes to the central bank for its debt are then circulated
back to the government, and second, inflation reduces the real
value of the sovereign debt.17 Therefore, debt monetization also
allows politicians to spend without incurring the pushback
from direct taxation, or it may act as an escape valve if the
country is threatening default.18
A. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Central bank independence is divided into three categories:
political, personal and financial.19 A direct and unequivocal
prohibition of anyone influencing the ECB’s decisions ensures
its political independence.20 Personal and financial
stable prices.”).
13. See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 577-81.
14. See id., at 388–89, 577–81.
15. See id., at 364–66, 568–76, 581–83.
16. Id. See also HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133. Even if debt
monetization should be viewed relative to inflation expectations, see Daniel L.
Thornton, Monetizing the Debt, 14 ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS
(2010)
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/10/ES1014.pdf, this is still the
process through which a central bank would finance government spending.
17. See Thornton, supra note 16.
18. See Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Remarks on Central Bank Independence and Sovereign Default
at the Sovereign Debt Seminar (Sept. 26, 2011) available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/kocherlakota_speech_Sept26-2011.pdf.
19. E.g., HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 128–36. The terminology
for categorizing elements of independence varies. E.g., Deller, supra note 12,
at 201–02 (referring to political independence as “institutional independence”).
20. See TFEU art. 130.
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independence act to reinforce political independence by
preventing politicians from removing officials or withholding
funding in reaction to an unpopular decision by the central
bank.21 Long tenures and removability only for cause protect
ECB officials’ personal independence.22 Though Member States
initially capitalized the ECB with five billion euros, it now
operates off the revenue provided by its monetary operations
which preserves the ECB’s financial independence.23
Another aspect of financial independence is how easily
governments can force central banks to monetize their debt.24
Generally, the more restrictive governments’ access to central
bank credit is, the more independent central banks are.25 For
instance, there may be legal restrictions on the amount of debt
that the central bank may purchase, the maturity of the debt,
whether the debt is collateralized, the interest rate paid
relative to market rates, whether the central bank is allowed to
purchase sovereign debt on the primary market or the reasons
for which the central bank can purchase debt.26 Ideally, an
independent central bank should not be allowed to purchase
government bonds because a central bank “can easily bypass
the prohibition on deficit financing” by purchasing government

21. See HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 130–32, n. 89; Deller,
supra note 12, at 202–06.
22. The Executive Board Members’ terms are eight years, TFEU art.
283(2), and national central bank governors will have at least five year terms,
HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 131. In addition, an Executive Board
member may only be excused if they are no longer able to fulfill their duties or
if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct. ECB Statute art. 11(4).
23. ECB Statute art. 28(1); Capital Subscription, European Central Bank,
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html (last updated Dec. 28,
2011).
24. HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133. These types of limitations
have been called “the most relevant of institutional guarantees of central bank
independence.” ANAND CHANDAVARKAR, CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 227 (1996). See also supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
25. See Alex Cukierman, Seven B. Webb & Bilin Neyapti, Measuring the
Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes, 6 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 353, 357 (1992).
26. See, e.g., John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The
Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 70, 86–87
(1998); Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti, supra note 25, at 359 (providing metrics
based on different levels of restrictions to each of these criteria); Robert
Sparve, Central Bank Independence Under European Union and Other
International Standards, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF
CENTRAL BANKS 269, 279–80 (2005) (noting the ECB electing not to use the
IMF’s recommendation of prohibiting quasi-fiscal activities).
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bonds on the secondary markets.27 However, purchasing
sovereign debt or using sovereign debt as collateral, which may
result in the debt being acquired by a central bank, is often
necessary to implement monetary policy and is largely seen as
unproblematic as long as quasi-fiscal operations are
prohibited.28
Article 123 of the TFEU creates the clearest barrier to debt
monetization for the ECB:
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit
facility with the European Central Bank or with
the central banks of the Member States
(hereinafter referred to as ‘national central
banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies,
offices or agencies, central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other
bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be
prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from
them by the European Central Bank or national
central banks of debt instruments.29
The TFEU clearly prohibits the direct purchase of Member
States’ sovereign debt by the ECB,30 but it is silent as to when
the ECB may purchase that debt from the secondary markets.
The Treaty likely only prohibits direct purchase of Member
State debt because the ECB may need to hold that debt in order
to implement monetary policy. The ECB primarily uses open
market operations to implement monetary policy.31 Through
27. PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY POLICY: GOALS, INSTITUTIONS,
STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS 214–15 (2001). See also HOWARTH & LOEDEL,
supra note 12, at 133.
28. See The Eurosystem’s Instruments: Open Market Operations,
EUROPEAN
CENTRAL
BANK
(last
visited
Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/intro/html/index.en.html#operations
(describing the open market operations of the ECB, which include refinancing
operations – for which collateral must be pledged – and fine tuning operations
– for which the ECB may directly purchase sovereign debt from the secondary
market; open market operations are aimed at manipulating the money supply,
i.e. implementing monetary policy). Prohibiting quasi-fiscal activities can be
prohibited by explicitly limiting what actions the central bank may take. See
Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Autonomy, Accountability and Governance:
Conceptual Framework, INT’L MONETARY FUND 7 (Aug. 18, 2004),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/lybek.pdf.
29. TFEU art. 123 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. ECB Statute art. 18; FRANCOIS NAUDIN, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK: A BANK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 187–90 (2000).
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these operations the ECB engages with banks to buy, sell, lend
and borrow claims and marketable instruments.32 When the
ECB extends credit to banks, the banks must provide
“adequate collateral.”33 Because the ECB has stringent criteria
for what constitutes “adequate collateral,” few marketable
instruments qualify.34 Of these, “the best available tier one
asset is local sovereign debt.”35 In addition, the ECB through
“fine tuning operations” buys and sells outright marketable
instruments including sovereign debt.36 Therefore, by engaging
in these operations the ECB may acquire sovereign debt
through default or purchase.
B. ECONOMIC RESTRAINTS FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
The Member States exclusively determine the economic
policies of the EU with guidance from the Treaties between the
Members.37 Member States, however, foresaw that
irresponsible economic policies of individual Member States
could have implications for the whole EU. For example, if a
Member State accrues too much debt and threatens to default,
other Member States or an EU institution, such as the ECB,
may need to rescue that Member State in order to preserve
stability in the EU.38 To avoid such a situation, the TEU
dictates that “Member States shall avoid excessive government
deficits.”39 The Member States empowered the European
Commission to monitor the development of the budgetary
situation in each Member State.40 Protocol No. 12, annexed to
32. ECB Statute art. 18(1).
33. Id.
34. See NAUDIN, supra note 31, at 192–94. The categories of eligible
market assets, as laid out by the ECB, include: central government securities,
regional government securities, uncovered bank bonds, covered bank bonds,
corporate bonds, asset backed securities and other marketable securities.
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, COLLATERAL DATA (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.ecb.int/paym/pdf/collateral/collateral_data.pdf?8b7bd994d87f09679
e7665319d2e8ea5. See generally, Collateral, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/html/index.en.html.
35. See NAUDIN, supra note 31, at 194.
36. The Eurosystem’s Instruments: Open Market Operations, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined..
37. TFEU art. 120.
38. For example, the ECB could monetize that country’s debt. See
HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133; Kocherlakota, supra note 18. See
also supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
39. TFEU art. 126(1).
40. TFEU art. 126(2).
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the TEU, limits public debts and deficits to 60% of GDP and an
annual rate of 3% of GDP respectively.41 To give these
provisions teeth, the EU implemented the Stability and Growth
Pact (the “SPG”).42 The SPG is made up of a preventative arm,
which requires Members States to report their fiscal outlook to
the EU,43 and a dissuasive arm, which gives the EU the ability
to warn and sanction non-compliant Member States. 44
The Treaty and the SGP, however, failed to keep the
Member States’ fiscal houses in order. Facing sluggish growth
and excessive deficits,45 the Member States elected to amend
the SGP rather than comply by its provisions.46 The ECB
voiced concern that the SGP’s new impotence would
“undermine confidence in the fiscal framework of the European
Union (“EU”) and the sustainability of public finances in the
euro area Member States,” as well as the price stability of the
EU.47 Nonetheless, the ECB’s warnings to Member States went
largely unheeded, and the Member States amended the SGP so
that it would have little power to constrain the Member
States.48

41. Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Mar. 30, 2010,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 279.
42. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact,
17 June, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 1 (EC).
43. See Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the Strengthening of
the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and
Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC).
44. See Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on Speeding Up and
Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Debt Procedure, art. 2, 1997
O.J. (L 209) 6 (EC). If the EU decided to sanction a Member State, the
Member State will be required to deposit a sum, ranging from 0.2% to 0.5% of
its GDP with the ECB, and if the its deficit was not reduced, the deposit woud
be forfeited. Id., at arts. 11–16; KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 98.
45. See KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 98–99. Compare Real GDP
Growth
Rate,
EUROSTAT,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&lan
guage=en&pcode=tec00115 (last updated Nov. 10, 2012), with Government
Deficit/Surplus,
Debt
and
Associated
Data,
EUROSTAT,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_dd_edpt1&lang=
en (last updated Oct. 26, 2012).
46. KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 101–02.
47. Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Statement of the Governing
Council on the ECOFIN Council’s Report on Improving the Implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact (Mar. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050321.en.html; KALTENTHALER,
supra note 11, at 99.
48. KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 99.
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C. SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
The EU, like much of the world, suffered through a deep
recession starting in 2008.49 While the entire EU was still
working to regain traction, Greece in early 2010 revealed that
the size of their deficit was much larger than it had previously
disclosed.50 This disclosure, combined with Greece’s already
substantial debt, led market participants to question Greece’s
ability to repay their debt. As a result, yields on Greek bonds
began to rise precipitously in April 2010.51 Investors’ fears also
led to increased yields on government bonds from countries
that either had very high debt levels and a weak recovery, such
as Portugal, or had been particularly ravaged by the recession,
such as Spain and Ireland.52 Indeed, in the summer of 2011,
the yields on both Spain and Italy’s bonds rose dramatically as
investors began to fear they would not be able to pay their
debts.53
For governments already struggling to accelerate their
economies and collect tax revenue, raising bond yields posed
another burden: in order to continue borrowing from lenders,
these countries had to pay a risk premium of higher interest
rates on the debt.54 However, increasing interest rates to
compensate for investors’ fear of default actually increases the
likelihood of default.55 If it costs a country more to borrow
49. See Real GDP Growth Rate, supra note 45.
50. Times
Topics:
European
Debt
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovere
ign_debt_crisis/index.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2012).
51. See id.; Greece Govt. Bond 10 Year Acting as Benchmark, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GGGB10YR:IND/chart (last updated Sept.
21, 2012).
52. Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, supra note 50; see also
Portuguese Government Bond 10YR Note Portugal PL, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GSPT10YR:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 21,
2012); Spanish Government Generic Bonds - 10YR Note, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GSPG10YR:IND/chart (last visited Sept. 21,
2012); Ireland Government Bonds 10 Year Note Generic Bid Yield,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GIGB10YR:IND/chart (last
updated Oct. 11, 2011) (demonstrating the increased bond yields in these
countries).
53. Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, supra note 50; see also Italy Govt
Bonds
10
Year
Gross
Yield,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GBTPGR10:IND/chart (last updated Sept.
21, 2012); Spanish Government Generic Bonds - 10YR Note, supra note 52.
54. See Derek Thompson, What is the ‘Contagion Effect’?, THE ATLANTIC
(May 18, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2010/05/what-is-the-contagion-effect/56858/.
55. Id.
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money, it is more likely that the country will not be able to
borrow enough to meet their current liabilities. The potential
contagion in other countries compounded the crisis, and a
series of defaults threatened to bring the EU to its knees in
early 2010.56
D. EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
In order to quell market fears and prevent defaults, the
IMF and European Member States created a financial safety
net for Greece which Greece then tapped into in late April
2010.57 In addition, the leaders of the Member States agreed to
create the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) on
May 9, 2010.58 The purpose of the EFSF is “to preserve
financial stability of Europe’s monetary union by providing
temporary financial assistance to euro area Member States if
needed.” Member States committed €780 billion to the EFSF.59
In conjunction with the creation of the EFSF, on May 10,
2010 the ECB acted to stabilize financial markets by launching
the Securities Market Programme (the “SMP”).60 The SMP
allowed the ECB to purchase sovereign debt from public and
private securities markets in order to drive down interest rates
to provide depth and liquidity to those markets.61 In addition to
providing liquidity to government bond markets, the ECB also
‘sterilized’ its purchases by absorbing an amount of liquidity
from the economy which was equal to the amount of
government bonds purchased.62
56. “Contagion” refers to the investor paranoia that if one country
defaults on their debt promises, more countries will. Id.
57. Timeline: Euro Zone Debt Crisis, REUTERS (June 10, 2010, 10:24 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/10/us-eurozone-eventsidUSTRE6593G320100610.
58. Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, Establishing a
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 2010 O.J. (L 118) 1; About
EFSF,
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL
STABILITY
FUND,
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The
lending capacity of the EFSF is currently €440 billion.
59. Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY
FUNDFUNDFACILITY,
1
(Sept.
10,
2012),
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf.
60. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, ECB MONTHLY BULL. 59,
72 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis].
61. Id.
62. The ECB sterilizes by opening seven day deposits to banks. See The
ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73. See also
Complete data set of History of All ECB Open Market Operations, EUROPEAN
CENT.
BANK,
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/
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The SMP led the targeted government bond yields to drop,
temporarily abating tensions.63 During the course of the SMP,
the ECB has purchased bonds from Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and Ireland in order to curb rising yields on those
countries’ bonds. 64 As of August 20, 2012, the ECB has
purchased €211.5 billion under the SMP.65 During the lifetime
of the SMP, there has been speculation from market
participants that the ECB will continue to act as long as
markets exert pressure.66
Member States have also signed two new treaties in order
for the EU to be better equipped to deal with such crises: the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union (“Treaty on Stability”)67 and the
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(“Treaty Establishing ESM”).68 The Treaty on Stability
reinvigorates the fiscal oversight of Member States and again
gives the EU the ability to levy sanctions against delinquent
Member States.69 The Treaty Establishing ESM creates a
permanent rescue fund to replace EFSF and acts as a lender of
top_history.en.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011); Summary of Ad Hoc
Communication,
EUROPEAN
CENT.
BANK,
http://www.ecb.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/communication.en.html
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2011).
63. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73.
64. Paul Carrel, ECB Says Will “Actively Implement” Bond-Buying,
REUTERS
(Aug.
7,
2011,
5:53
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/07/us-crisis-ecbidUSTRE7762PE20110807. See also, e.g., Greece Govt Bond 10 Year Acting as
Benchmark, supra note 51; Ireland Government Bonds 10 Year Note Generic
Bid Yield, supra note 52 (depicting the rising bond yields in Greece and
Ireland in chart form).
65. See ECB Eurosystem Securities Market Program, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ECBCSMP:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 14,
2012).
66. See Jack Ewing & Raphael Minder, Stocks Surge as a Fed Statement
Sinks In: Central Bank Props Up Spain and Italy, for Now, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2011, at B.1 (“They will do whatever it takes because they will be forced to
. . . .”).
67. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic
and Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://europeancouncil.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf [hereinafter Treaty on
Stability].
68. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 1, 2012,
No.
D/12/3,
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/12/3&type=HT
ML [hereinafter Treaty Establishing ESM].
69. See, e.g., Treaty on Stability, supra note 67, art. 8(2).
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last resort to distressed Member States.70
A combination of efforts from the European Governments,
the IMF and the ECB has prevented any outright defaults by
European governments or meltdowns in the European markets.
There is little doubt that such actions helped to stave off the
pain that would have resulted from a disorderly breakdown of
European public finances. Furthermore, the ECB has
vigorously defended the legality of the SMP. Yet there has been
a growing dissent that the ECB, while helping save the
markets in the short term, has overstepped the boundaries of
its power and engaged in debt monetization. This, critics argue,
has also undercut price stability and the independence upon
which the ECB and the European economies depend.
II. LEGALITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SMP
The SMP had the effect of driving down yields in the
markets for select government bonds.71 Lower bond yields have
both fiscal and monetary implications. A fiscal implication is
that those governments are able to borrow money at a lower
interest rate.72 This has aided those governments in staying
solvent. A monetary implication is that those government bond
markets moved more freely which enabled the ECB to use
those markets to implement its monetary policy effectively.73
The ECB’s motivation in implementing the SMP will therefore
70. See generally Treaty Establishing ESM, supra 68, art. 23–24
(outlining the dividend policy and establishment of a reserve fund).
71. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 72.
72. See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text.
73. The ECB, as the sole issuer of Euros, determines the short term
interest rate for the European money market through its open market
operations, standing facilities, and minimum reserve requirements for credit
institutions. See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank,
Speech at the 38th Economic Conference of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank: The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions in Financial
Markets
(May
31,
2010),
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100531_2.en.html [hereinafter
The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions]. The ECB then relies on
functioning credit markets to affect the cost of credit for consumers, the
amount of economic activity and, thus, price levels. Id. See generally The
Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK,
Feb.
2011,
at
5,
9–13,
available
at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/gendoc2011en.pdf (presenting the
operational framework for the Eurosystem’s monetary policies and
procedures); Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy, EUROPEAN CENT.
BANK, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (depicting a flow chart demonstrating the process
through which monetary policy decisions affect the economy).
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largely depend on which results it has been trying to effectuate
and which results were simply ancillary.
For legal observers therein lies the problem: depending on
which motivations and outcomes the ECB intended in
implementing the SMP, its actions are more or less legally
dubious. The ECB was explicitly created to determine and
implement monetary policy in order to maintain price
stability.74 At the same time, Member States are to determine
and implement economic, or fiscal, policies.75 It is true that the
Member States opted not to ban the ECB specifically from
engaging in fiscal activities76 and that the ECB may support
the “general economic policies in the Union” if it does not
threaten price stability.77 However, the structural separation of
monetary and fiscal responsibilities in the TEU78 and the
ECB’s insistence that it acts solely for monetary reasons79 are
strong indicators that the ECB may not act for fiscal reasons. If
so, the ECB may have overstepped the powers the Member
States ceded to it and violated the TEU.
A. THE SMP AS MONETARY POLICY
The ECB has insisted that the SMP is a tool of monetary
policy on three grounds: first, it complies with the letter of the
Treaty, second, it is necessary to implement monetary policy,
and third, the ECB has continued to maintain price stability.80
74. TFEU art. 127(1)–(2).
75. Id., art. 120 (“Member States shall conduct their economic policies”).
76. This would have provided a clearer boundary. See Lybek, supra note
28, at 7 (“The potential for quasi-fiscal activities should be eliminated in the
central bank law, which can be done by explicitly prohibiting activities that
are not provided for under the act . . . .”).
77. TFEU art. 127. Therefore, while not entirely banned from engaging in
such activities, the ECB is significantly limited in its ability to support
governments in a direct or individualized way.
78. See id., art. 120–26 (economic policy) and id. art. 127–33 (monetary
policy). See also TFEU art. 127 (“The primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
79. See Trichet supra, note 9 (“We have one needle in our compass, which
is price stability.”).
80.
See, e.g., Jürgen Stark, Member of Exec. Bd., European Cent. Bank,
IMFS Distinguished Lecture: Central Banking after the Financial Crisis (Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110221.en.html
[hereinafter Central Banking after the Financial Crisis]; The ECB’s Response
to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
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In addition, some members point to the ECB’s restraint in the
size and duration of the SMP to demonstrate its monetary
purposes.81
i. The Treaty’s Text
The ECB primarily exists to maintain price stability.82 The
ECB is charged with “defin[ing] and implement[ing] the
monetary policy of the Union,”83 and the ECB is empowered to
make “decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks
entrusted . . . under the Treaties . . . .”84 In order to do this, the
ECB under the ECB Statute is able to “operate in the financial
markets by buying and selling outright . . . claims and
marketable instruments.”85 Except for transactions which the
Member States prohibited the ECB from engaging in, such as
directly purchasing government bonds,86 the Member States in
the letter of treaties have granted the ECB a great deal of
latitude in establishing and implementing monetary policy.
It remains unclear what boundaries exist for the ECB
while acting under the auspices of monetary policy. This is in
part because “[t]he European Central Bank . . . is loath to
acknowledge any limitations on its monetary policy arsenal.”87
Despite this, some ECB officials have publically described the
impetus for the SMP and some reasons for its necessity. These
reasons, they argue, establish that the SMP is a tool of
monetary, not fiscal, policy; if it is a tool of monetary policy,
then the SMP is a legitimate tool for the ECB to use.
ii. Necessary for Monetary Policy
In May 2010, the ECB, along with the rest of the world,
observed tensions and volatility in the financial markets.88 The
ECB identified the European debt markets, particularly the

81. See Central Banking after the Financial Crisis, supra note 80.
82. TFEU art. 127(1).
83. Id., art. 127(2).
84. Id., art. 132(1).
85. ECB Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
86. TFEU art. 123(1).
87. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66.
88. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Introductory
Statement at the Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of
the
European
Parliament
(June
21,
2010),
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100621.en.html
[hereinafter
Introductory Statement].
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sovereign debt markets, as the epicenter of the tension.89 The
ECB saw an increasing risk that the markets would become so
impaired by the volatility that the ECB’s transmission
mechanism for monetary policy would no longer be able to
function.90 Without being able to implement monetary policy,
the ECB would not be able to maintain price stability.
Then-President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet,
identified three channels for monetary policy which
malfunctioning government bond markets were impeding.91
First, there is the price channel.92 Because the price of
government bonds influences the price of non-government
credit, the soaring interest rates on government bonds can
raise the price of non-government credit. 93 If the interest rates
rise enough because of these risks, it may overwhelm the
changes in interest rates that the ECB is trying to establish for
purposes of monetary policy.94 Second, there is the liquidity
channel.95 Government bonds play an important role as
collateral in the money market, the point of contact between
the ECB and credit institutions.96 If there is a chance that
banks will not be able to trade government bonds, interest
rates will increase and trading will slow, which may impede
monetary policy transmission.97 The final channel is the
balance sheet channel.98 If government bonds’ yields are
higher, then by definition the bonds’ prices are lower.99 With
less capital, banks may extend less credit; again, the less
money that flows through the financial system, the less
effective the transmission of monetary policy.100
Because of the importance of government bond markets in
these channels, the ECB argues that it would not be able to
implement monetary policy or maintain price stability without
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.; Introductory Statement., supra note 88.
98. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
99. When Yield Goes Up, Price Goes Down, YAHOO! FINANCE (last visited
Sept.
20,
2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/education/bond/
article/101195/When_Yield_Goes_Up_Price_Goes_Down.
100. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
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action.101 Therefore, it is necessary for the ECB to moderate
dysfunctional markets with the SMP.102 Because the ECB’s
treaty powers are unequivocal about its responsibility to
implement monetary policy and maintain price stability103 and
the ECB is allowed to purchase bonds from the secondary
market,104 the ECB argues that it has the legal authority to
implement the SMP in order to fulfill its mandate.105
The ECB’s argument concerning the implementation of
monetary polic is compelling in some respects, but ultimately
unsatisfying. It is true that if the ECB is going to implement
monetary policy, it needs to have functioning mechanisms
through which it can transfer its policies into the economy at
large. Given the importance of sovereign debt markets, they
likely play an important role in this transfer. However, there is
scant limiting principle in the ECB’s explanation. Seemingly,
the ECB is asking for carte blanche to implement new
programs provided their justifications are based on ensuring its
ability to implement monetary policy. Such wide authority
could allow the ECB to act for any reason as long as its nominal
reason is monetary policy. If they do act for other reasons, for
example to prop up fledgling Member States, the ECB would
exceed the power ceded to the ECB by the Member States.
iii. Sterilization and Price Stability
Although the Treaty requires the ECB to define and
implement monetary policy, it also requires monetary policy to
be oriented toward the ECB’s primary mandate: price
stability.106 When the ECB buys sovereign debt with euros, it is
injecting money in the economy. When the ECB increases the
monetary base, it could cause inflation to rise over the ECB’s
target, potentially altering its monetary stance and
jeopardizing price stability.107
The ECB insists that is not engaged in quantitative easing
or debt monetization and that price stability maintains it
primary focus despite the SMP.108 This is because the ECB
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
TFEU art. 127(1)–(2).
See id., art. 123; ECB Statute art. 18(1).
The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
TFEU art. 127(1)–(2).
See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.
Id.
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sterilizes every euro it injects into the economy through the
SMP by removing euros from the economy in an equal
amount.109 Because sterilization prevents the SMP from
increasing the amount of euros in the economy, the ECB’s
monetary stance as a whole, it argues, remains unaltered.110
Sterilization also lends credibility to the ECB’s commitment to
price stability, which critically reassures investors.111
Critics of the SMP are skeptical about the effectiveness of
the ECB’s sterilization because the ECB has also pursued a
very accommodating monetary policy throughout the lifespan of
the SMP. The ECB has offered unlimited loans through its
refinancing operations as another non-standard measure to
support liquidity.112 If a bank deposits money with the ECB, as
part of the ECB’s sterilization efforts, and then is able to take
out a loan the next day from the ECB, critics argue that the
sterilization is not effective.113 If the banks want more credit,
and by extension allow an increase in the monetary base, they
are free do so.
iv. A Limited, Emergency Measure
Jürgen Stark, formerly of the ECB’s executive board,
109. See The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73.
When ECB purchases sovereign debt through the SMP, it increases the
amount of euros in the economy. By having banks deposit an equal amount of
euros through weekly liquidity absorption operations, the ECB is decreasing
the amount of euros in the economy by an equal amount so that the SMP will
have a net-neutral effect on the money supply. See Liquidity Analysis:
Monetary
Policy
Portfolios,
EUROPEAN
CENTRAL
BANK,
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
110. See id.; The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 753.
111. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73
(explaining how sterilization confirms the ECB’s commitment to price
stability, and how credibility is essential in maintaining price stability).
112. Ansgar Belke, Driven the by Markets? ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases
and the Securities Market Programme, Directorate General for Internal
Policies, Policy Dept. A: Economic and Scientific Policies, Economic and
Monetary Affairs (June 8, 2010), at 7. See also Tracy Alloway, Sterilised and
Scandalised,
FT.COM/ALPHAVILLE
(May
18,
2010,
8:15
AM),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/05/18/233726/sterilised-and-scandalised/.
113. Lecture by Markus C. Kerber: The ECB Under Fire, OPEN EUROPE
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=1660
[hereinafter ECB Under Fire]. The ECB has also failed to fully sterilize the
SMP on several occasions, see Jana Randow, ECB Fails to Sterilize Bond
Purchases
With
Deposits,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
1,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/ecb-fails-to-sterilize-bondpurchases-for-third-time-since-program-began.html, though the infrequency
with which this has occurred indicates that it is not a major concern as of now.
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focused on defining the SMP as a temporary measure to ensure
that the SMP was not being used for fiscal purposes. He
insisted that “the ECB has entered a terrain in which it should
not stay longer than absolutely necessary” and that the SMP
would be phased out as soon as it has resolved the dysfunction
of the government bond markets.114 Stark argued in February
2011 that the temporary nature of the SMP, as well the “clearly
limited scope and scale of our outright purchases in securities
markets . . . has also mitigated any blurring of monetary and
fiscal responsibilities.”115
Stark subsequently resigned because of the expansion of
the SMP in August 2011, 116 indicating that the ECB’s
prudence and self-restraint may not have been sufficient to
contain the SMP. Indeed, other ECB officials, including
Trichet, have been reticent to point out specific limitations in
duration or size of the SMP.117 In the three months following
reactivation of the SMP in early August 2011, the value of
government bonds on the ECB’s balance sheet has increased by
€100 billion, compared to the €75 billion accumulated in the
fifteen preceding months.118 As a result of such actions,
analysts and bank insiders believe that the ECB can legally go
as far as it wants in purchasing government bonds.119
Professor Marcus Kerber, who filed a lawsuit against the
ECB over the SMP in September 2011, echoes the concerns by
Stark.120 Professor Kerber insists that continuing to justify the
SMP under the premise of emergency action is disingenuous.
He stated that there are no permanent emergencies and that
the ECB has in effect assimilated the SMP into its standard
monetary policy.121 Because the ECB has only justified the
SMP as an emergency measure, Kerber argues, it is now
overstepping what it is legally allowed to do.122
114. Central Banking after the Financial Crisis, supra note 80.
115. Id.
116. Marc Jones, ECB's Spent 14 bln Euros on Bonds Ahead of Stark Exit,
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/12/ecbbonds-idUSEAP50OC3520110912.
117. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 75
(explaining that the SMP is “time-bound in nature” but not actually specifying
a time limit).
118. ECB Eurosystem Securities Market Program, supra note 65.
119. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66.
120. ECB Under Fire, supra note 113.
121. Id.
122. Id.

DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013))

232

2/21/2013 1:51 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

B. THE SMP AS FISCAL POLICY
Critics of the SMP claim the ECB is inappropriately
blurring the line between fiscal and monetary policy.123 Despite
the ECB’s insistence that the SMP was created only for
monetary purposes, it has also had substantial fiscal effects.124
The TEU was constructed to preserve a very high level of
independence for the ECB,125 and that independence as
formulated in the Treaty demands that fiscal and monetary
policies should be separate.126 Structurally, the TFEU
demonstrates this by providing separate spheres for the two
realms of policy – Member States create fiscal policy and the
ECB creates monetary policy127 If the ECB implemented the
SMP for fiscal reasons, it may have exceeded its legal power.
Critics of the SMP have put forward two main arguments
that the SMP is in violation of the Treaty on European Union.
First, the Treaty’s prohibition on purchasing sovereign debt
directly from Member States is meant broadly to prohibit debt
monetization. As debt can be monetized on the secondary as
well as the primary markets, it makes little difference if the
ECB buys sovereign debt from the primary or secondary
markets if its purpose is debt monetization. Second, there is a
great deal of evidence that the motivation for the SMP was
primarily to provide support to beleaguered governments; it
was a fiscal act.
i. The Purpose of Article 123
Article 123’s prohibition on direct government bond
purchases by the ECB is not an end unto itself but an effort to
restrain central bank support for government spending.128
Making the prohibition applicable only to purchases of
government bonds on the primary market was an imperfect
solution to preventing debt monetization because debt
123. See, e.g., Axel Weber, President, Deutsche Bundesbank, Keynote
Speech at the Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC) Symposium:
Monetary Policy After the Crisis: A European Perspective (Oct. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r101018a.pdf?frames=0.
124. See supra notes 51–64, 73–75 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 19–36 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 11–18, 24–28 and accompanying text.
127. See TFEU art. 120–26 (economic policy) and art. 127–38.
128. See generally supra notes 11–18, 25–36 and accompanying text
(discussing how politicians can pressure a central bank to support government
spending through debt monetization).
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monetization can still occur by purchasing government debt
from the secondary market.129 ECB officials themselves
acknowledge that outright purchases of government bonds
could be the beginning of debt monetization, even on secondary
markets.130 Although a general prohibition on purchasing any
government bonds would have been more effective at
preventing debt monetization,131 such a provision was not
practicable because of the need to use sovereign debt in
implementing monetary policy.132
Former German President Christian Wulff, among others,
has suggested that Article 123’s prohibition must be
understood as a prohibition against debt monetization in a
broader sense and not strictly against debt monetization
through direct purchases of government bonds.133 He stated
that “this ban only makes sense if those responsible don’t
circumvent it with comprehensive purchases on the secondary
market.”134 This sentiment is in accord with the idea that when
independent central banks purchase government bonds from
secondary markets, they still should do so exclusively for
monetary and not quasi-fiscal purposes.135
Acknowledging that it is possible to monetize sovereign
debt on secondary markets and that outright purchasing of
sovereign debt is the first step to do so, it is therefore possible
that the SMP is a program that is monetizing debt. If the
Article 123 is understood as a broader prohibition against debt
monetization, the ECB would therefore be in violation of the
Treaty.
ii. Fiscal Motivation
There is no smoking gun from ECB officials that
demonstrates that the SMP was created for fiscal reasons. In
fact ECB officials have consistently couched the SMP in terms
of monetary policy.136 However, the way in which the ECB used
129. See Bofinger, supra note 27.
130. Stark, supra 82 (“[O]utright purchases of government debt . . . might
be perceived as a first step towards a monetisation of government debt.”).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 24–28.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 31–36.
133. Paul Carrel, German President Questions Legality of ECB Bond Buys,
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/ecbgermany-bonds-idUSL5E7JO15720110824.
134. Id.
135. See Lybek, supra note 28, at 7.
136. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73

DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013))

234

2/21/2013 1:51 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

the SMP in conjunction with fiscal events and institutions
indicates that the ECB acted for fiscal reasons.
Professor Kreber described the SMP as fiscal policy,
specifically as it applied to Italy.137 Kreber offered two pieces of
evidence for this: the communication between Trichet and
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and the sheer amount of
support given to Italy through the SMP.138 The communication
was a letter sent by Trichet and then-ECB Governing Council
Member, now-ECB President, Mario Draghi to the Italian
Prime Minister.139 In the letter, the ECB outlined fiscal steps
that it viewed as essential for Italy.140 The Italian government’s
compliance with the ECB’s demands resulted in the ECB
reactivating the SMP on a very large scale to relieve the
market pressure on the Italian bond market.141 In other words,
Kreber argues, the ECB threatened to discontinue giving the
Italian bond market buoyancy in order to force Italy to comply
with its demands for specific fiscal measures.142 This causeand-effect relationship between fiscal policy and the SMP
demonstrates that the SMP was implemented for fiscal
reasons.143 In addition, the ECB’s use of the SMP as a carrot for
Italian budgetary reform represents an indirect but real foray
by the ECB into establishing a Member State’s fiscal policy.144
The relationship between the EFSF and the SMP also
suggests the SMP has fiscal motivations. ECB officials have
characterized the SMP as a “bridge” until the EFSF has more
financial ability to intervene.145 Yet, the EFSF was set up
(“However, we have not gone beyond the goal of re-establishing a more correct
transmission of our monetary policy. We have not changed our monetary
policy stance . . .”).
137. ECB Under Fire, supra note 113, at (11:33).
138. Id. at (14 :20).
139. Id. at (11 :52).
140. Mario Draghi & Jean-Claude Trichet, Trichet e Graghi: Un’azione
Pressante Per Ristabilire la Fiducia Degli Investitori, ECONOMIA (Sept. 29,
2011),
http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a
5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml.
141. See ECB Under Fire, supra 113.
142. See id. at (12:00).
143. See id. at (14:20).
144. See id at (12:00).
145. Weidmann Warns of the Consequences of Soft Restructuring in Greece,
EUROINTELLIGENCE
(May
26,
2011),
http://www.eurointelligence.com/eurointelligence-news/archive/singleview/article/eu-commissioner-becomes-first-official-to-warn-about-greek-exitfrom-the-eurozone.html (“The eurosystem has acted in a phase when the fiscal
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explicitly “to safeguard financial stability in Europe by
providing financial assistance to euro area Member States.”146
The SMP and the EFSF are both used to purchase bonds in
tumultuous sovereign debt markets, but only the EFSF can
purchase sovereign debt on the primary market.147 However,
the difference between primary and secondary market
purchases matters little in practical terms in distinguishing
between fiscal and monetary motivations because either may
be used to implement fiscal policy.148 Because the EFSF is used
to save Member States and the SMP and the EFSF work in
very similar ways, the SMP is also likely a creature of fiscal
policy.
Given the similarities between the SMP and the EFSF, the
ECB’s insistence that it is not legally able to support the EFSF
indicates the SMP may have been improper. For example, the
French government among others suggested that the EFSF
attain a banking license so that it could borrow money from the
ECB.149 However, this suggestion was rejected both by
Germany and the ECB.150 The Bundesbank President, Jens
Weidmann, rejected the idea specifically because such lending
would have amounted to monetary state financing.151 Trichet
agreed that ECB leveraging of the EFSF would be
‘inappropriate.’152 Given the similarities between the SMP and
policy was unable to act. By doing so it built a bridge.”); see Valentina Za, ECB
Should Stop Bond Buys Once EFSF Bolstered-Constancio, REUTERS (Oct. 10,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/ecb-bonds-constancioidUSL5E7LA15W20111010.
146. About EFSF, supra note 58.
147. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 75; About
EFSF, supra note 58.
148. Jack Ewing, Lending a Hand to Banks, but Not to Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/business/global/as-european-nationsteeter-only-lenders-get-central-banks-help.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&hp.
149. Mark Deen & Gabi Thesing, Baroin Says ECB Role Bolstering EFSF
Remains ‘Best Solution’, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-19/baroin-says-ecb-rolebolstering-efsf-remains-best-solution-.html.
150. Annika Breidthardt & Luke Baker, Options Left for Leveraging EFSF
Do
Not
Involve
ECB,
REUTERS
(Oct.
21,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-eurozone-efsf-leverageidUSTRE79K64820111021.
151. Eva Kuehnen & Annika Breidthardt, ECB Should Stay out of EFSF
Leveraging:
Buba
Chief,
REUTERS
(Sept.
17,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/17/us-ecb-leveragingidUSTRE78G17B20110917.
152. Jeff Black & Jana Randow, Trichet Says Not ‘Appropriate’ for ECB to
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the EFSF, it is hard to explain why the ECB’s involvement in
the EFSF is inappropriate while implementation of the SMP is
not.
III. THE ECB AT A CROSSROADS
Now that the European Union has moved beyond the most
acute dangers of the debt crisis, the European Union needs to
ensure that such an event does not occur again. The debt crisis
was a fiscal event; Member States borrowed to a point where
investors doubted their ability to repay their debts.153 This
doubtraised interest rates on government borrowing and
threatened government defaults which in turn necessitated
action by the ECB.154
The ECB’s response to the sovereign debt crisis was
necessary to prevent a meltdown of the European economy.155
When the crisis erupted in early 2010, no European entity
could shoulder the burden of unsound government spending
with as much credibility or speed as the ECB.156 Without the
SMP to quell market fears, widespread default by major
European governments was a real possibility.157
Now the ECB is at a point where it needs to define its role
in future crises. As one ECB official stated, “[I]f a central bank
comes under pressure in times of crisis, and succumbs to that
pressure, it is very unlikely to exit from such extraordinary
measures in a timely manner. This may unanchor inflation
expectations . . . .”158 Not only may the ECB not exit its crisis
measures in a timely manner, but by acting to prevent the
fiscal collapse of Members States, it has signaled to Member
States that it will act if needed. The knowledge that the ECB
will and can act to drive down bond yields of targeted countries
significantly weakens each Member State’s incentive to follow a
prudent fiscal course. If the market demands too high a risk
premium from a Member State, the ECB will counter. So, given
Leverage
EFSF,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
6,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/trichet-says-financial-markettensions-may-slow-expansion.html.
153. See Thompson, supra note 54.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 49–68, 151–153 and accompanying text.
158. Jürgen Stark, Mem. ECB Exec. Bd., European Central Bank, Speech
at the 13th Annual Emerging Markets Conference 2011: The Global Financial
Crisis and the Role of Monetary Policy (Sept. 24, 2011).
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the ECB’s willingness to act, it is necessary to examine whether
the ECB’s ability to act should be modified.
This Note identifies three possible ways forward. First, the
ECB could continue to muddle along, skirting the line between
monetary and fiscal policy. Second, the Member States could
eschew the strict division between monetary and fiscal policy
by revising the ECB’s mandate allowing the ECB to concern
itself equally with both price stability and economic growth.
This legitimizes tools such as the SMP to some extent. Finally,
the solution endorsed by this Note: the ECB’s ability to
intervene in government debt markets could be limited so as to
adhere more strictly to the principles laid down in the TFEU.
A. THE MEMBER STATES’ CURRENT FISCAL CONTEXT
Changes have been put in place in order to prevent another
crisis. Two major breakdowns in the European Monetary Union
allowed the debt crisis to occur. First, the oversight system of
the SGP and “peer pressure” from other Member States failed
to force other Member States to keep sound public finances.159
Second, bond market participants failed to demand sufficiently
varying risk premia from euro zone countries based on an
assessment of each country’s financial situation.160 With
pressure from other Member States and the markets failing to
materialize, some Member States did not implement structural
change, accumulated large debts and their potential defaults
threatened the European financial system.
After the debt crisis, pressure on Member States to take a
prudent approach to their finances has ratcheted up. Member
States reinvigorated the SGP to give oversight of each other’s
finances more teeth.161 Member States signed the Treaty on
Stability which allowed stiffer penalties for excessive debts or
159. Peter Praet, Mem. ECB Exec. Bd., Lecture at the International Center
for Monetary and Banking Studies: Monetary Policy at Crisis Times (Feb. 20,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120220.en.html.
160. Id.
161. See Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on
Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks on the Member State, 2011 O.J. (L
306) 41; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12 (EU); Regulation 1173/2011 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective
Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L306) 1
(EU); Council Regulation 1177/2011of 8 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L306) 33
(EU).
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deficits.162 Markets now discriminate more dramatically
between bonds from different Member States.163 Provided that
neither Member States nor markets become lax in exerting
pressure, such actions should provide a solid basis to prevent
another crisis. In the case that these actions are not enough,
Member States have assigned the Treaty Establishing ESM to
take over the EFSF’s function as lender of last resort
permanently, as a “firewall” to ensure all Member States
remain solvent.164
B. OPTION ONE: THE STATUS QUO
The ECB could continue to implement the SMP on an ad
hoc basis as it has done since the beginning of the crisis. Such
an approach has proven to prevent default and contagion by
giving the ECB some latitude to reassure markets that it will
act when needed.165 It also allows the ECB nominally to remain
faithful to its mandate of price stability by insisting that the
SMP is a temporary, emergency measure to ensure it is able to
implement monetary policy and provide price stability.166 This
approach relies on the prudence of the ECB and does not
require any revision of its powers or responsibilities.
The status quo, however, is not the preferred choice
because it perpetuates the ambiguous nature of the ECB’s role
in times of crisis. While such a course would effectively split the
baby between the proponents and opponents of the SMP, it is
an answer that is satisfactory for neither. Instead, as the SMP
has exemplified, such a path does not provide sufficient
reassurance for markets or confidence in the ECB’s
commitment to price stability.
On the one hand, the SMP appears to have compromised
the ECB’s commitment to price stability because it was likely
implemented in order to prevent Member States’ defaults. The
ECB’s ability to preserve price stability depends crucially on its
independence.167 Its independence, in turn, depends on Member

162. See Treaty on Stability art. 8.
163. Compare Greece Govt. Bond 10 Year Acting as Benchmark, supra note
51, with German Government Bonds 10 Yr Dbr, BLOOMBERG (last visited Mar.
22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GDBR10:IND/chart.
164. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 39–40.
165. See Thompson, supra note 54.
166. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66.
167. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
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States not being able to force the ECB to take action. 168 This
includes Member States not being able to force the ECB to
purchase government bonds because of potential insolvency. 169
When the ECB acted to preserve Member States from
defaulting, it acted in response to political decisions by those
Member States, undermining its independence and potentially
its price stability.
On the other hand, the SMP was likely less effective than
it could have been in easing tensions in the short-term.170 With
prominent critics, such as the Bundesbank, voicing concerns
over the SMP’s legality, some investors were skeptical that the
ECB would deploy its limitless balance sheet and fully act as a
backstop to Member States threatened with default.171 As a
consequence, investors demanded higher risk premia than they
may have if there were no doubt that the ECB would purchase
unlimited amounts of bonds.172 While providing some buoyancy,
the status quo has not prevented as much nervousness as an
unbridled intervention into government bond markets by the
ECB would have.
C. OPTION TWO: EXPAND THE ECB’S MANDATE
The second option is to expand the ECB’s mandate and
allow it to pursue economic goals as a coequal goal with price
stability. This option would involve balancing the economic
imperatives of the EU against price stability and would allow
the ECB to intervene in bond markets explicitly for economic
reasons as is the case in other major economies.173 A dual
168. See supra notes 11–28 and accompanying text.
169. See Kocherlakota, supra note 18.
170. See James Wilson, Bundesbank Squares up to ECB’s Draghi,
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 1, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb33529863be-11e1-8762-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1pa55qxck.
171. See id.
172. Simon Kennedy, Italy Bond Attack Breaches Euro Defenses As Crisis
Worsens, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201111-09/italy-bond-attack-breaches-euro-s-defenses-as-region-s-contagionworsens.html; see generally Ewing, supra note 154.
173. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2010) (“The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production,
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices,
and moderate long-term interest rates.”); Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 10(2)
(listing the central bank’s goals as: the stability of the currency of Australia,
the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and the economic prosperity
and welfare of the people of Australia); see also Joe Weisenthal, LOOK:

DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013))

240

2/21/2013 1:51 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

mandate would free the ECB to pursue policies, such as the
SMP, that may unmoor inflation expectations to some degree
but would also give confidence to investors that the ECB will
backstop precarious markets and prevent Member States from
defaulting.174 Given that preventing default of Member States
or languid economic growth within the EU are certainly
economic goals of the Member States,175 tools such as the SMP
would then more comfortably fit within the ECB’s mandate and
may be viewed as legitimate.
Giving the ECB express authority to intervene in the
markets to prevent default or stimulate growth would likely
help to improve the short-term economic stability in the EU. By
knowing the ECB will intervene if needed, markets will likely
be less prone to large fluctuations because market participants
will be more confident that the ECB’s limitless balance sheet
will provide a backstop to rising bond yields. Having the ECB
use its balance sheet as a tool for fiscal stability is an approach
that has worked to a limited degree through programs such as
the SMP.176 It is also an approach that has been encouraged by
some Member States and other major economies, such as the
United States, in the context of the ECB providing funding to
the EFSF, but this approach was subsequently rejected as
exceeding the ECB’s mandate.177
Such an approach would be an overt affirmation of what
commentators and market participants already assume will
happen. Many commentators believe that because the ECB is
the only credible backstop to Member States defaulting, it will
need to expand the role it is already playing in purchasing
bonds.178 Some market participants are testing the ECB’s
There's One Solution For Europe, Everyone Knows What It Is, And If It Doesn't
Happen, There Will Be A Collapse, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2011, 8:00
pm),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-save-the-eurozone-2011-11
(“Every other major economy in the world [besides the EU]: Japan, the UK,
the US, China, etc. has a central bank that funds the government.”).
174. Kennedy, supra note 172.
175. TFEU art. 127.
176. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Deen & Thesing, supra note 149; Rainer Buergin & Jonathan
Stearns, Germany Rejects Using ECB to Lift EFSF Rescue-Fund Firepower,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept.
17,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-17/germany-rejects-using-ecb-tolift-efsf-rescue-fund-firepower.html.
178. Jack Ewing, Lending a Hand to Banks, but Not to Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/business/global/as-european-nations-
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willingness to purchase unlimited amounts of government
bonds.179 So, moving from tacitly accepting the responsibility
for stabilizing financial markets and encouraging growth in the
short-term to explicitly accepting this responsibility may
amount more to a change in rhetoric than to a shift in policy.
This Note chooses not to endorse this approach for two
reasons. First, the TFEU clearly contemplates a division of
fiscal and monetary policies.180 The reason for this division is to
preserve the independence of the ECB and maintain price
stability.181 This was the deal brokered by the Member States
as part of the grand bargain in creating the EU. The Member
States wanted fiscal decisions to be made by the Member
States. Leaving fiscal decisions with the Member States
ensures that those making such decisions are, appropriately,
politically accountable. It provides long-term confidence to
markets by ensuring price stability. Therefore, the ECB’s
singular adherence to price stability should be maintained.
Second, allowing the ECB to backstop struggling countries
still threatens the ECB’s independence. Such an approach puts
great confidence in the revamped fiscal oversight that has
transpired since the debt crisis and effectively removes the
market discipline imposed on Member States through different
interest rates for different Member States.182 Politicians and
market participants would ideally have a long memories and
act diligently to ensure budgetary discipline, especially given
the recent structural changes regarding accountability between
Member States. However, knowing that there is a safety net
may encourage Member States to slip back into complacency
and take on more debt than they are able to service.183 If debt
loads are too burdensome because of deficits, Member States
could force the ECB to take action again. If the ECB is so forced
teeter-only-lenders-get-central-banks-help.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&hp;
Andreas Cremer, Euro Zone Hangs on ECB Bond Buying, Krugman Tells
Handelsblatt,
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-10/euro-zone-hangs-on-ecb-bondbuying-krugman-tells-handelsblatt.html; Simon Kennedy, Italy Bond Attack
Breaches Euro Defenses As Crisis Worsens, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-09/italy-bond-attack-breaches-euros-defenses-as-region-s-contagion-worsens.html.
179. See Ewing & Minder, supra note 66.
180. See TFEU arts. 120–26 (economic policy) and arts. 127–33 (monetary
policy).
181. See supra notes 11–17, 24–36 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 167–170.
183. See Ewing & Minder, supra note 66.
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to take action, it cannot be acting independently. This would
undermine a bedrock principle of monetary policy.
D. OPTION THREE: LIMITING THE ECB’S ABILITY TO
INTERVENE IN MARKETS
The third option is to limit the ECB’s ability to intervene in
markets with tools such as the SMP and thereby firmly limit
the ECB’s ability to engage in quasi-fiscal activities. Such an
approach would preserve the division between monetary and
fiscal policy as envisioned by the framers of the TEU. While not
providing the short-term stability offered by option two,
limiting the ECB would help to reaffirm the independence of
the ECB and anchor price stability to encourage long-term
growth.
i. Proposed Limitations
Member States should restrict the ECB’s ability to engage
in quasi-fiscal activities by limiting the amount of sovereign
debt the ECB is able to hold; the ECB should also permanently
end the SMP as soon as the ESM is operational. This
restriction should not affect government bonds used as
collateral by banks engaged in open market operations with the
ECB. It should allow the ECB to engage in fine-tuning
operations by outright sale and purchase of government bonds
on a scale consistent with conventional fine-tuning operations.
This restriction would leave the ECB with full discretion to
determine the appropriate monetary policy and implement it
using its standard tools, but it would also significantly limit the
ECB’s ability to make targeted interventions into government
bond markets.
This restriction would be a supplementary provision to
Article 123’s prohibition on debt monetization and would
reestablish the ECB’s commitment to price stability. As Article
123 prohibits the ECB from engaging in debt monetization
through the primary markets,184 this new restriction would
restrain the ECB from engaging in debt monetization through
the secondary markets. In implementing this measure, the
Member States would remedy an imperfection in the original
prohibition on debt monetization: the ECB is currently able to
monetize debt by purchasing government bonds on the
secondary market.
184. TFEU art. 123.
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Unlike reformation of the ECB’s mandate, this solution
would enlist markets to impose discipline on Member States.
Removing the ability for the ECB to intervene on a large scale
in government bond markets will send a strong signal to
market participants that they must diligently evaluate each
Member State’s finances and set that State’s interest rates
accordingly. Pricing government bonds in such a way will allow
each Member State to borrow in accordance with the soundness
of their finances. While the newly implemented fiscal restraints
and oversight within the EU will hopefully prove effective, this
solution will employ the markets as an additional means to
exert pressure on Member States.
ii. Ending the SMP
The ECB should transfer the balance of the SMP to the
ESM when the ESM is operational. The ESM will have a
sufficient balance sheet,185 and the ESM was created explicitly
to prevent the insolvency of Member States. As laid out in the
Treaty, the ESM is meant “to mobilise funding and provide
stability support . . . to the benefit of ESM Members which are
experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems,
if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro
area as a whole and of its Member States.”186 In other words,
the ESM is structured to be the firewall that the SMP was
previously. It should be employed for that purpose.187
In addition, the responsibility for backstopping potentially
insolvent Member States is more appropriately reposed with
the Member States. As laid out in the TFEU, fiscal policies are
the responsibility of the Member States.188 Deciding whether
to intervene in government bond markets and preventing the
default of Member States has reverberating implications for
other Member States. When an EU institution takes on the
debt of a Member State, all members of the institution will
suffer a loss in the case of that Member State’s default. Because
of potential fiscal implications for each of the Member States
and their electorates, such decisions should be left to the
185. Compare the current holdings by the ECB under the SMP, ECB
Eurosystem Securities Market Program, supra note 65 (€218 billion as of
March 22, 2012), with the lending capacity of the ESM, Treaty Establishing
ESM art. 41 (€500 billion).
186. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 3.
187. Kennedy, supra note 178.
188. See TFEU art. 120.
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politically accountable governmental bodies. In addition, when
extending credit through the ESM, Member States may attach
conditions to the loans.189 The ability formally to tie an
extension of credit to structural and budgetary changes for a
Member State provides more accountability and transparency
than informal conditions that the ECB may require.190
iii. Potential Concerns
Some question exists as to how much debt the EFSF/ESM
can shoulder because of its finite balance sheet. 191 Such
uncertainty may make market participants nervous and may
put short-term stability in question. However, while market
stability is a concern, it should not prohibit taking this step.
The reasons such concerns should not be prohibitive are both
fundamental to the nature of the EU and practical in light of
the ESM and the ECB’s resistance to large scale intervention.
This proposal is laid out as a way to preserve the
fundamental division contemplated in the TFEU, not to salve
markets. That division was made to ensure the ECB’s
independence, price stability and the Member States’ long-term
fiscal discipline. Market confidence in the ECB stems from its
infinite balance sheet,192 but if the ECB was actually to employ
that balance sheet it could undermine its independence and
price stability. Such action would therefore likely exceed the
level of power and responsibility ceded by the Member States to
the ECB in the formation of the European Union. Efforts to
continue reserving to the Member States those powers they
intended not to cede should therefore trump short-term market
demands.
From a more practical perspective, the ESM should be able
to handle the amount of government bonds that have been
acquired by the ECB through the SMP.193 It is possible that the
new measure would exacerbate the demand put on the ESM
because the belief that the ECB would intervene if needed
189. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 12 (“Such conditionality may range
from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous respect of preestablished eligibility conditions.”).
190. See supra notes 143–148 and accompanying text.
191. Willem Buiter, EFSF Needs Bigger Bazooka to Maximise Its
Firepower,
FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4886f7a-03d3-11e1-bbc500144feabdc0.html#axzz1ckfBgwG5.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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would no longer exist and the volatility in government bond
markets could increase. However, this concern should not be
overstated. Public questioning of the SMP’s legality has
tempered market participants’ expectations that the ECB will
use its balance sheet.194 While the current state of the
government bond markets reflects some expectation that the
ECB will intervene, that expectation is tempered by the ECB’s
resistance to further intervention.195 Therefore, the change in
short-term stability resulting from the ESM, not the ECB,
being responsible for intervention may not be as pronounced as
some would expect.
iv. Adherence to the TFEU’s Principals
This solution stays in line with the broad principles of the
TFEU. In constructing the EMU, Member States gave the ECB
one primary mandate: price stability.196 The Member States
retained for themselves their fiscal policy.197 To preserve the
ECB’s independence, and hence price stability, fiscal and
monetary matters are insulated from each other through
provisions such as the prohibition on monetary financing.198
Given these guiding principles, a limit on the amount of
sovereign debt the ECB may purchase would help to preserve
its independence and price stability by removing the legal
ambiguity.
In addition, the ECB would likely welcome this limitation
on their ability. Just as the ECB has demonstrated that it will
respond when needed to preserve the EMU,199 it has also
demonstrated that it will not work outside the letter of the
Treaty.200 Commentators have noted that the ECB is
uncomfortable with the SMP and looks forward to its
discontinuance.201 European Central Bank officials have stated
194. Wilson, supra note 170.
195. See Gabi Thesing, ECB Seeks to Shed ‘Uncomfortable’ Bond-Buying
Duty:
Euro
Credit,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
2,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/ecb-seeks-to-shift-uncomfortablebond-buying-to-rescue-fund-euro-credit.html.
196. TFEU art. 127.
197. Id. art. 120.
198. See supra notes 11–36 and accompanying text. See Lybek, supra note
28, at 7 (advocating a prohibition for central banks on quasi-fiscal activities).
199. See generally supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
201. See Gabi Thesing, ECB Seeks to Shed ‘Uncomfortable’ Bond-Buying
Duty:
Euro
Credit,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
2,
2011),
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that it should not allow the program to continue longer than
necessary.202 Just as ECB officials supported handing over the
task of capping yields to the EFSF,203 it will likely welcome
handing it over to the EFSF’s successor, the EMS.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has described the motives and the purposes of
the SMP in regards to the ECB’s independence and mandate.
The TEU granted the ECB a very large amount of
independence, most notably for this Note through the
prohibition on debt monetization. However, having been
confronted by the European sovereign debt crisis, the ECB had
to implement the SMP in order to keep sovereign debt markets
functioning. Although the ECB has always described the SMP
in terms of monetary policy, there are plausible fiscal
motivations for the SMP. Through ambiguity in the Treaty, the
ECB has been able to stave off greater crisis in the euro zone.
However, the current lack of limits on the SMP, the
questionable effectiveness of the ECB’s sterilization of the bond
purchases and the ready fiscal explanation of the SMP threaten
to compromise the ECB’s independence and adherence to price
stability. The more appropriate organ to deal with potential
Member State insolvency is the ESM. Therefore, this Note
suggests limiting the amount of government bonds that the
ECB may purchase and transferring the balance of the SMP to
the ESM. This will put further legal restrictions on the ECB’s
ability to monetize debt which will reaffirm the ECB’s
independence and commitment to price stability, as well as
allow market pressures to instill discipline in government fiscal
policy.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/ecb-seeks-to-shift-uncomfortablebond-buying-to-rescue-fund-euro-credit.html.
202. Central Banking after the Financial Crisis, supra note 82 (“[T]he ECB
has entered a terrain in which it should not stay longer than absolutely
necessary.”).
203. See Thesing, supra note 201.

